Ireland's Rejection of the Lisbon Treaty and the EU's Impasse. by Parsons, Craig et al.
EUSA Review    Fall 2008   1 
Inside the Fall 2008 EUSA Review:
From the Chair        Liesbet Hooghe  2 
EUSA Review Forum:  
 Ireland’s Rejection of the Lisbon Treaty and the EU’s Impasse 
  
 Introduction        Craig Parsons  4
 Ireland Votes No        Chris J. Bickerton  4
 The Travails of Justifying Integration in 
  Referendum Campaigns      Andrew Glencross  6
 One No Too Many       Renaud Dehousse  8
 “Menu” Europe:  Re-inventing the EU after the Irish No  Vivien A. Schmidt  9
 The EU’s Direct Democratic Surplus     Gary Marks   11 
    
EUSA Political Economy Interest Section Essay
 
 The Euro as International Currency: An Interim Report  Benjamin J. Cohen  14 
  
    
Book Reviews 
 Andrew Smith, Book Reviews Editor         18
Reports from the 2008-2009 Haas Fellowship Recipients     
            Jennifer Hadden  22
            Jennie Schulze  23 
                 
    
Volume 21, No. 4
Fall 2008
2     Fall 2008  EUSA Review
A Time of Turmoil
it was a sunny morning in the last week of Septem-
ber in Chapel Hill. A student in my freshman seminar 
stopped me mid-sentence. What was the meaning of 
the financial bailout?  Should we brace for depres-
sion? For the next 45 minutes I had an impromptu 
discussion with 21 deeply concerned young adults. 
I never got back to my lecture. Not since 9/11 had I 
seen deeper doubt in student eyes. I must confess 
that while my analysis might have been detached, 
it was overly reassuring. Suppressing my darkest 
fears I proposed that we had a very good chance of 
meeting this challenge—and would certainly do bet-
ter than Hoover – or even Roosevelt. We had some-
thing these leaders lacked: international governance. 
There is much greater institutional capacity—and 
practical experience—among central banks and 
governments in coordinating policy. Joint and timely 
action can beat back the dark shadows. Yes it can.
Then came “the week that panic stalked the mar-
ket” (Financial Times, 10/10/08), with the Dow suffer-
ing its worst weekly drop ever (18 percent), banking 
paralyzed, and the drama watched with blank aston-
ishment by uncoordinated governments. My optimism 
sounded increasingly like wishful thinking. Three stu-
dent presentations on the financial turmoil and two 
on its transformative effect on the US presidential 
elections later, a student remarked, “we college stu-
dents usually live in a bubble of know-nothing-care-
little—no more.” Seventeen of 21 students had called 
home to ask their parents’ advice. In the early hours 
of October 13, European governments announced a 
coordinated $2.4 trillion rescue package which sta-
bilized the financial markets, refocused my EU semi-
nar, and restored some credibility to my argument. 
Seismic events have a way of throwing up facts 
that generate – or sink – theories. It is too early to see 
how this will pan out, but one can speculate about the 
likely targets of intellectual discomfort – or innovation. 
With Anglo-American neoliberal capitalism in disar-
ray the debate on political economy is shifting from 
whether to how governments should regulate mar-
kets. If one takes at face value the admonishments of 
Peer Steinbrück or Paul Krugman and the mea culpa of 
Alan Greenspan—that minimizing market regulation was 
wrong-headed—the western world, including the United 
States, is moving towards regulated capitalism. Perhaps 
the contrast between coordinated and liberal market va-
rieties of capitalism will be diffused, as in the response 
From The Chair
to the Great Depression. Recent research on competi-
tion between national capitalisms within an overarching 
EU framework had already begun to refine varieties of 
capitalism, but are we witnessing convergence to one 
type, the emergence of a hybrid, or the reconfiguration 
of institutional complementarities along novel lines? 
More fundamentally, the crisis has shaken belief in 
our capacity to predict social phenomena. In a recent 
PBS broadcast, the mathematician Benoît Mandelbrot, 
student of chaos theory and fractal geometry, attributed 
the meltdown to a failure among economic agents and 
policy makers to face up to the fundamental unpredict-
ability of the global economy. Globalization is commonly 
understood as referring to increased velocity and den-
sity of transnational interaction, but Mandelbrot empha-
sized a consequence: interdependence alters, and vastly 
complicates, causality by creating the potential for small 
events to have massive, destabilizing, consequences. 
Closer to home, the coordinated European res-
cue effort may be seen as a vindication of both inter-
governmentalism and supranationalism. Sarkozy and 
Brown, in matching superman suits, give credence to the 
former, and the prominent roles of the ECB, the Com-
mission and Eurozone institutions to the latter. Perhaps 
the most surprising feature of European crisis manage-
ment is that Europe was capable of taking bold joint 
action at all. Fragmented institutions, dispersed power 
and an EU-skeptical post-Lisbon mood seemed to struc-
ture incentives towards unilateralism and inaction. But 
Europeans could exploit a resource that was in short 
supply in the US: a willingness to perceive government 
as a solution and not merely as the problem. The be-
lief that markets should be left to police themselves has 
never achieved much traction in Europe. Europeans 
were predisposed to reconsider Keynesian activism. 
In EUSA news, paper submission to EUSA’s next 
conference in Marina del Rey, California, is now closed. 
EUSA received about 300 paper submissions and 100 
panel proposals. This is about the same as the sub-
missions for the 2007 Montreal conference. We are 
introducing a new feature – the workshop format – to 
allow us to accommodate more participants without in-
creasing the number of parallel panels and without in-
tensifying audience competition. You will be notified 
per email about the outcome by December 15, 2008. 
Now is the time to consider taking out an insti-
tutional membership option, which allows you to of-
fer your graduate students attractive conference con-
ditions. We also invite you to support our drive to 
replenish the E.B. Haas Memorial Fund for EU stud-
ies, which finances summer pre-doctoral fellowships.
 EUSA welcomes three new European Union Cen-
ters for Excellence in the US:  the University of Califor-
nia at Berkeley, the University of Colorado, and Geor-
gia Tech. Congratulations! The news about the awards 
was announced by the Delegation of the European 
EUSA Review    Fall 2008   3 
Commission in Washington, D.C., in October. Eleven 
European Union Center of Excellence grant recipients 
were selected from a field of 23 candidates. The three 
newcomers join eight Centers that were successful 
in renewing their grant: Florida International & Miami, 
Michigan-Ann Arbor, North Carolina-Chapel Hill, Pitts-
burgh, Texas-A&M, Washington-Seattle, Wisconsin-
Madison, and the Washington D.C. Consortium (Ameri-
can, George Mason, George Washington, Georgetown, 
Johns Hopkins). North Carolina will continue to serve 
as Network and Outreach Coordinator, and maintain 
the common network website at http://www.euce.org.
Liesbet Hooghe, UNC Chapel Hill and 
VU Amsterdam
Help your graduate students get to 
Marina Del Rey!
Consider taking out one of two institu-
tional membership options:
•	 Sustaining	membership	($1,000/




four graduate students 
Departments, centers, or individuals that 
become institutional members by Janu-
ary 31, 2009, are eligible. Please contact 
eusa@pitt.edu for details.
Ernst Haas Memorial Fund Drive
EUSA is announcing a drive to raise $10,000 for the Ernst Haas Memorial Fund for 
EU studies, which funds summer pre-doctoral fellowships. Donors will be honored at 
the Friends of EUSA Reception at the Marina del Rey EUSA conference, Saturday, 
April 25 2009. Be there to receive recognition! 
 $350 Silver donor  $750 Gold donor  $1500 Platinum donor
       OR
I would like to contribute to the Ernst Haas Memorial Fund:               $……….
I would also like to co-sponsor the Friends of EUSA reception               $..........
                       (and receive sponsorship mention on the program)
Please email credit card details to eusa@pitt.edu
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EUSA Review Forum
Ireland’s Rejection of the Lisbon Treaty and 
the EU’s Impasse
the eu institutions today find themselves in a deep 
impasse. At the root of the impasse lies the fact that 
these institutions are built on diplomatic treaties. Modi-
fying their main rules requires new treaties, ratification 
of which requires domestic referendums in some of 
the 27 EU countries (and creates the option of refer-
endums in most of the others). But getting even mod-
est institutional reforms past a gauntlet of national 
referendums has proved more and more difficult. The 
not-very-earthshaking reforms originally proposed in 
the Constitutional Treaty in 2004—some streamlin-
ing of decision-making rules, some strengthening of 
foreign-policy mechanisms, and a smattering of oth-
er fixes—have been rejected in two separate rounds 
of referendums. Strong No votes in France and the 
Netherlands brought the Constitutional Treaty crash-
ing down in summer 2005. Though the subsequent 
repackaging of the same reforms in the Lisbon Trea-
ty testified to their broad support across European 
elites, another clear No in Ireland this year left these 
measures in limbo. Since the Lisbon Treaty was al-
ready “plan B”—and since the Irish resent having 
been asked to re-vote on the previous round of EU 
reforms, after they rejected the Nice Treaty in 2001—it 
is now hard to see any path to treaty reform at all. 
This Forum’s essays dissect the problems that 
generated this impasse, and begin to look at solu-
tions. They proceed roughly in order of increasing 
abstraction. Christopher Bickerton (Oxford University) 
concretely breaks down the reasons for the victory of 
the No in Ireland. Andrew Glencross (European Uni-
versity Institute) then provides a more comparative 
discussion of Irish opposition relative to that in France 
in 2005, noting their many common themes. Renaud 
Dehousse (Sciences Po) argues still more broadly 
that the technical, elite nature of the EU institutions 
and their widening membership have made it simply 
impossible to maneuver EU reform past national rati-
fications. Vivien Schmidt (Boston University) draws 
out an implication for policy: what she calls a “menu 
Europe.” She suggests that it is time for the EU to 
recognize that a uniform status of membership is no 
longer workable, and to move toward more flexible 
“menus” of participation. Gary Marks (UNC Chapel 
Hill)  draws out overarching implications for European 
democracy. The problem, he argues, is not just that 27 
ratification processes make forward movement impos-
 
 
sible, but that referendums per se are flawed instru-
ments of democracy and are especially problematic 
in the EU context. They polarize complex politics into 
single dichotomies. Not only does this make it difficult 
to work out cross-issue compromises and trade-offs, 
which Marks sees as the heart of “the art of politics” 
and which are central to the functioning of the EU, but 
it brings polarization without clear choice. As the pre-
ceding essays show, people end up on either side of 
EU referendums for many unrelated reasons, so even 
a clear aggregate result has few clear democratic im-
plications. For Marks, this means the EU must look 
to stronger channels of representative democracy, not 
referendum-style direct democracy, for legitimation and 
participation. But how this recommendation fits with a 





on the 13th of june, 2008, the Irish voted on the 
Treaty of Lisbon. Agreed upon by member states 
in late 2007, this “mini-treaty” was what EU leaders 
had managed to salvage from the draft Constitution 
after the No votes in France and Holland in 2005. 
Ireland is the only country so far to have had a 
referendum on this treaty. 53.4% of the votes were 
against the treaty, 46.6% were in favour. Of the 27 
member states, 23 have now ratified the treaty and 
more will follow. The victory of the No vote in principle 
leaves the treaty null and void since all member states 
must ratify it if it is to come into effect in January 2009 
as planned. On the back of the Irish vote, the Czech 
government decided to subject the Treaty of Lisbon 
to a decision by its supreme court (Economist 2008).1 
Some EU leaders have argued that ratification 
should continue regardless and that a compromise 
can be made with Ireland to ensure a favourable 
outcome in a second vote. An alternative would be 
to abandon the treaty altogether and to implement 
some aspects of it without tying everything together 
into a single treaty. It is conceivable that if the Irish 
vote No a second time they will be asked to leave the 
EU, though this is not a position any member state 
will defend publicly. A second Irish No would prob-
ably bring down Prime Minister Brian Cowen’s gov-
ernment. It would certainly raise more questions 
about the EU’s strained relations with its own citizens.
One of the leading architects of the “mini-treaty” 
was French President Nicolas Sarkozy. The No vote 
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disrupted the beginning of a much-hyped French 
presidency of the EU. However, since then it has el-
evated President Sarkozy to the position of “crisis 
manager in chief.” Sarkozy travelled to Ireland on 
July 21, promising to listen to the Irish. His visit pro-
voked angry reactions after he reportedly said that Ire-
land would have to vote a second time, pre-empting 
what should be a decision for the Irish government.
 
The No campaigners
The No campaign in Ireland was similar in some 
ways to the French No campaign in 2005. It was 
made up of disparate groups and interests, which 
spanned the political right and left. The vast major-
ity of the Irish establishment was on the side of the 
Yes campaign, as in France in 2005 (Halimi 2005). 
However, in the three years since France rejected 
the Constitutional Treaty, the politics of opposition to 
the EU has evolved (Marks & Steenbergen 2004).
One of the main groups leading the No vote was 
Libertas, a campaign group founded by Declan Gan-
ely, an Irish millionaire businessman. The group was 
originally set up in opposition to the regulation and 
red-tape ostensibly coming from Brussels, and turned 
against the Lisbon Treaty in recent months. Its cam-
paign focus was on the loss of Irish influence in EU de-
cision-making, the undemocratic nature of the EU, and 
the threat of tax harmonisation. Ireland has a 12.5% 
corporation tax—one of the lowest in Europe—which 
many view as essential for Irish economic growth. 
Libertas combined free market and pro-business 
rhetoric with a nationalist defence of Irish interests 
against the encroachments of the EU bureaucracy. 
Given the extent of Ireland’s economic ties with the 
rest of the EU, Ganely cut a lonely figure as much 
of the business establishment was on the Yes side.
Many other groups in the No campaign shared 
Libertas’ nationalist rhetoric. Sinn Féin combined a 
welfarist economic agenda—at odds with Ganely’s 
anti-regulatory zeal—with the same nationalist senti-
ment. On the economy the EU was viewed as a ma-
lign force for deregulation, particularly in the area of 
workers’ rights. With the slogan “Ireland deserves bet-
ter,” Sinn Féin highlighted Ireland’s waning influence 
in EU decision-making. Sinn Féin also played up the 
dangers the treaty posed for Irish neutrality, suggest-
ing that the Lisbon Treaty would draw Ireland into 
the EU’s common security and defence structures. 
Alongside these groups, many other issues 
and interests were raised. Irish farmers raised con-
cerns about the EU’s position on trade issues at 
the World Trade Organization, issuing warnings 
to the EU’s trade Commissioner, Peter Mandel-
son. Devout Irish Catholics argued that the EU rep-
resented a threat to Ireland’s anti-abortion laws. 
A new disenchantment
If the No campaign was so full of contradictions, 
how can we explain its success? One important fac-
tor lies outside of the No camp itself. What secured 
the result was more than simply the mobilization of 
anti-abortion Catholics, free market zealots, anti-war 
leftists and old school Republican nationalists. In fact, 
according to polls, only six percent of the No vote was 
made up those who wanted to protect the Irish tax sys-
tem; and only two percent voted No because a fear of 
what EU legislation might mean for issues like abor-
tion and gay marriage (Flash Eurobarometer 2008).
Crucial to understanding the 2008 vote was the 
mobilization of a new anti-EU constituency: the hith-
erto politically apathetic, who this time felt that their 
lack of understanding of the Treaty was a sufficient 
reason to vote No. The message of the Yes camp 
had effectively been, “trust us, the Treaty is compli-
cated but we know it is in your best interest.” It was 
this claim to expertise which was rejected by twen-
ty-two percent of those who voted No due to a lack 
of information, by far the most popular reason given 
for voting against the treaty. It is also significant that 
sixty-five percent of 18 to 24 year olds voted No. The 
referendum seems to have expressed a new disen-
chantment with the kind of politics that asks of vot-
ers mere acquiescence with whatever the political 
elites say is the best way forward (Bickerton 2008) 
 
Ireland against the rest
Another element explains the success of the 
No campaign: diverse themes were united under 
the common banner of defending Ireland’s interests 
against those of more powerful EU member states 
and of the Brussels bureaucracy itself. A David-ver-
sus-Goliath theme emerged, evident in the popular 
No slogan of “Don’t Be Bullied.” Twelve percent of 
the No voters said they voted No in order to protect 
Irish identity within Europe; six percent were con-
cerned about Ireland’s neutrality; six percent were 
afraid of losing an Irish European Commissioner; 
and three percent were afraid that small states would 
be left worse off with the new Treaty.  This national-
ist concern gave the No campaign a coherence and 
resonance which it would otherwise have lacked. 
Which No?
These two forces behind the No vote need to be 
distinguished from one another. The lack of trust evi-
dent in many people’s decision to vote No reflected the 
state of the relationship between Irish citizens and their 
6     Fall 2008  EUSA Review
own political establishment. Above all, it represented a 
challenge to the expertise-driven rhetoric of European 
integration and to the legitimacy of the Irish government.
The nationalist impulse, on the contrary, was not 
a challenge to Cowen’s government; it united Ire-
land in the struggle against other powerful EU mem-
ber states and the Brussels-based institutions. An 
internal political battle was transformed into a battle 
between states and between Ireland and the EU. 
Which No prevails over time will have important 
consequences for European politics. Underlying the 
attack on the politics of expertise is a strong demo-
cratic sentiment which rejects elitism in the name 
of popular self-determination. Promoting Irish inter-
ests against those of other EU member states will 
only blur the lines of political conflict, pitting Euro-
pean peoples up against each other instead of unit-
ing them in opposition to their own elites. European 
integration, after all, is not something that is “out 
there” in Brussels; it has become a continuation of 
domestic politics and should be understood as such.
Chris J. Bickerton is Departmental Lecturer in Inter-
national Relations at the University of Oxford
Notes
1 It is expected that the Treaty will not be considered 
a challenge to the Czech constitution when the court 
gives its decision, due before the end of the year.
2 For three accounts of European integration as a 
constitutive feature of domestic politics, see Heart-
field (2006), Bartolini (2005) and Schmidt (2005).
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The Travails of Justifying Integration in 
Referendum Campaigns
Andrew Glencross
much has been made of the complex structural nature of 
the EU that appears to fate European government to 
be for the people rather than by the people (Schmidt 
2004). This complaint about the entrenched demo-
cratic deficit implies there is an institutional remedy: 
strengthening the Parliament vis-à-vis the Council, 
enhancing EU competences to ensure greater public 
and party interest in EP elections, and stimulating the 
development of transnational political participation. 
However, another interpretation of the current mal-
aise of integration, which has left EU citizens feeling 
so disempowered in the face of EU governance (Mair 
2007), suggests that this situation is the result of a 
problem of justification as much as of democratic le-
gitimation (Morgan 2005). According to this logic, the 
EU “is less in need of an institutional than a justifica-
tory fix” (Ibid, 4). With the demise of the permissive 
consensus in favor of elite-driven integration, democ-
ratization is not a sufficient condition of EU legitimacy: 
citizens also need to be persuaded of the merits of 
continued integration. Yet as the recent referendum 
campaigns in Ireland and France illustrate, national 
political elites find it very difficult to live up to this task. 
This paucity of persuasive public justifications for fur-
ther integration is another—but less noted—compo-
nent of the phenomenon of “depoliticization” associ-
ated with non-majoritarian governance (Mair 2007). 
In Ireland, the 2008 campaign against ratification 
of the Lisbon Treaty was led by Sinn Féin alongside a 
coalition of minor and even ad hoc parties. The oppo-
sition camp had two principal arguments: objection to 
the weakening of Irish power (the result of the loss of a 
permanent commissioner and fewer national vetoes) 
and preventing “the militarization of the EU.” The latter 
targeted the treaty’s provisions for beefing up cooper-
ation on foreign and security policy, seen as the death 
knell for neutrality by requiring Irish contingents for 
supposedly dubious EU humanitarian interventions. 
Supporters of the Lisbon Treaty, a group including 
all the main parties except Sinn Féin, were slow to 
respond directly to these claims. Rather, they resort-
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ed to the stalwart justification of securing economic 
prosperity and also tried to establish positive historical 
precedents for Irish peacekeeping efforts. The primary 
objective, when engaging with the arguments of the 
No camp, was thus to convince voters that changes 
to the status quo were not deleterious to Irish influ-
ence and neutrality. This justificatory strategy sat 
awkwardly with two important contextual elements of 
the debate. Firstly, it was difficult to maintain that the 
treaty changes were so trifling when it was well known 
that the document was essentially the Constitutional 
Treaty redux. Likewise, this argument also appeared 
in contradiction with the grander claim that the new 
treaty would finally help reduce the democratic deficit.
The logic of the 2005 French Yes campaign for the 
Constitutional Treaty was beset by similar justificatory 
problems. Public debate in France was peculiarly fixat-
ed on “liberalism”: a pejorative, scare-mongering term 
conjuring an image of unfettered Dickensian capital-
ism. Other issues (political finality, institutional reform, 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights or foreign policy) 
were marginalized (Ivaldi 2006). Jacques Chirac, de 
facto leader of the Yes camp, was placed on the back 
foot by claims that the treaty would undermine French 
social welfare. In fighting back, his central justification 
of the Constitutional Treaty invariably related to social 
justice—a startling move given this subject did not fig-
ure in the objectives he had set the Constitutional Con-
vention (Jabko 2005), the body tasked with an open-
ended mandate to revise the existing treaty system.
Chirac’s justificatory strategy was as ambiguous 
as that used to support the Lisbon Treaty in Ireland. 
At times the constitution was presented as a way of 
exporting the French “social model” to the rest of the 
EU, thereby establishing a common European social 
model. In a primetime television debate he referred 
to the treaty as “the daughter of 1789.” But he also 
stressed the existence of certain safeguards (the 
clauses on “services of general economic interest”) 
that would allow for the preservation of the French 
social model from attack by Anglo-Saxon neo-liber-
alism. Hence the Irish and French Yes campaigns 
were founded on equally precarious justifications. The 
former tried to present the Lisbon Treaty as inconse-
quential for the strength of Ireland’s voice in Europe 
yet a great leap forward in democracy. The latter of-
fered a vision of the Constitutional Treaty as simul-
taneously protecting France’s supposedly unique 
public services whilst spreading its social model. 
Tellingly, the notion of political finality—which fol-
lowing Joschka Fischer’s speech in 2000 became 
central to the debate over an EU constitution—was 
rarely broached during these referendum campaigns. 
Supporters of treaty reform in Ireland and France con-
sequently failed to justify the integration project en-
shrined in a particular treaty vis-à-vis alternative forms 
of European governance. Notably, little attempt has 
been made during referendum moments to explain the 
merits of the current EU system in comparison with a 
confederal Europe of nations or a fully federal state. 
This failure to justify persuasively the present—let 
alone future—outcome of integration, something mid-
way between confederation and federal state, is un-
doubtedly related to the continued confusion surround-
ing what stage of integration has already been reached 
(Morgan 2005: 29). Of course, such difficulties consti-
tute grist to the mill for those who doubt the appropri-
ateness of holding popular votes on treaty ratification. 
However, this would be to overlook the more significant 
fact that such justificatory problems are an integral 
part of the cost of constructing a polity without politics.
Depoliticization, as Peter Mair (2007) has ex-
plained, is best understood as the process of losing 
voice—the necessary means for controlling govern-
ment. Diminished opportunities for voicing opposi-
tion explain the odd bedfellows seen in the Irish and 
French No campaigns: pacifists, nationalists and 
partly foreign-funded libertarians in the former, social-
ists and greens (defying the party line) alongside the 
extreme right in the latter. The antagonism towards 
treaty ratification was mutual but the arguments de-
ployed against a common enemy were vastly differ-
ent. In other words, the Yes camp in both France and 
Ireland was not alone in putting out a mixed message. 
Treaty ratification was defeated through an alliance 
of opponents of EU policies—those preferring greater 
or lesser intervention in the market—and opponents 
of the principle of further integration. The challenge for 
national elites, therefore, is less to shelve the refer-
endum option than to take up the mantle of nurturing 
constructive political opposition. Chiefly, this entails 
finding a way of channeling the cleavage over EU 
policies away from the cleavage over EU integration 
per se. Although it is not at all clear that such a feat 
is manageable (Hix and Bartolini 2006), the justifica-
tory strategy adopted during future referendums is 
likely to be a crucial device in any such endeavor. In 
particular, elites supporting treaty reform will have to 
spend more time explaining what level of integration 
has currently been reached as well as what substan-
tive policy objectives can only be pursued through fur-
ther institutional reform. Above all, this means resisting 
the temptation to expound justificatory arguments that 
barely correspond with the content of treaty reform 
or that take the form of hackneyed promises—mixed 
with thinly-veiled threats—about securing prosperity.
Andrew Glencross is a Research Fellow at the Eu-
ropean University Institute
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One No Too Many
Renaud Dehousse 
the irish referendum on the Lisbon Treaty has 
placed European leaders in a very difficult situa-
tion. Unless Europe decides to thoroughly re-ex-
amine the pact which is uniting Europeans, it will 
soon come up against new barriers. At this point, 
the crisis is too deep: patching it up will not work. 
First, this referendum confirms that Europe is 
suffering from a social fracture. Once again, a plan 
broadly supported by the elites (political forces rep-
resenting 90% of the elected members of Parliament) 
was just as clearly rejected by disadvantaged popu-
lation groups. The breakdown of the “No” votes also 
revealed a cleavage between urban and rural areas 
similar to that which existed in France in 2005. As 
confirmed in September by a poll commissioned by 
the Irish government, the No was at its highest among 
blue-collar workers.  The message is still the same: 
the rapid changes we are seeing in the European 
economy and society are creating manifold concerns. 
This phenomenon is all the more remarkable in 
that it is occurring in a country which, having profited 
immensely from the expansion of international trade 
and from its thirty-five-year membership in the Euro-
pean Union, has experienced very strong growth in the 
last fifteen years. The vote’s outcome can no doubt be 
partially attributed to situational factors—a slowdown 
in growth and an unpopular government. Once again, 
we are encountering the “cocktail” components expe-
rienced in France and the Netherlands in 2005, but 
it would be ill-advised to ignore the ballot’s message. 
Those who believe that socio-economic changes are 
threatening their way of life are anxiously watching 
the emergence of a European integration project the 
sense of which they cannot grasp. How could it be 
otherwise, inasmuch as the leaders of the 27 Mem-
ber States cannot agree on either the primary “finalité” 
of the process —the setting-up of a continental mar-
ket or a political actor— or even on its geographical 
boundaries? The same message had been power-
fully expressed not only in France—as has too often 
been said—but in all countries in which a plebiscite 
has been held on the draft EU Constitutional Treaty. 
Yet what has been done to address these concerns?
Secondly, the referendum instrument has once 
again demonstrated its limitations. It would certainly 
be hard to imagine a more unsuitable document to 
foster dialogue than the Lisbon Treaty. There is noth-
ing surprising about that, inasmuch as it had been 
specifically designed to amend existing treaties in or-
der to bypass the need for a plebiscite. Yet the prob-
lem extends far beyond the style and wording of the 
document in question. The referendum is predicated 
on the premise that a simple response can be made 
to the question asked. When the latter is an open-end-
ed question—“What sort of Europe do you want?”—
and, what is more, no clear response is suggested, 
it would take a miracle for it to produce a positive 
result. Asking a binary question about such a com-
plex document will infallibly generate a profusion of 
doubts and objections.  And given the binary nature of 
the consultation process, even radically contradictory 
objections may result in a similar negative response. 
To the French campaign’s flagship slogan, “We all 
have a reason to vote no,” the dominant theme of the 
Irish referendum has provided a kind of echo: “I don’t 
understand, so I vote no.” The misunderstanding of 
what was at stake in the referendum was one of the 
main reasons advanced to explain negative results in 
all the polls. A total of 42 per cent of those who voted 
No cited this as the main reason, according to a poll 
carried out by Millward Brown in the last week of July, 
and 90% of voters who regarded themselves as in-
adequately informed ultimately decided to vote “No.” 
We need to drop the simplistic idea that a debate on 
a document this complex will bring voters the clarifica-
tions they are seeking.  In the Irish case, government-
commissioned research found that a third of people 
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thought that conscription into a European army and 
an end to Ireland’s abortion ban were part of the Lis-
bon Treaty, while over forty per cent believed it would 
force the country to do away with its low corporate tax 
rate. This high degree of misinformation is all the more 
remarkable given the intensity of the campaign and 
the high turn-out; it is hard to describe as the result 
of indifference or apathy. Even if such a debate were 
held on a European level, the issue would not fun-
damentally change. Other ways of involving citizens 
in European decision-making must be envisaged.
Third, the deadlock in which Europe now finds 
itself shows that it has reached the limits of the re-
forms which could be successfully implemented 
within the current system’s framework. It has been 
known for a long time that unanimity is paralyzing or 
at least leads to sub-optimal outcomes when a large 
number of actors are involved. That is the very rea-
son why people have renounced the idea that it can 
be achieved in many areas in which the Europeans 
are committed to act together. After Maastricht, Nice 
and the Constitutional Treaty, the Lisbon Treaty is 
the fourth project to come up against a veto within 
a fifteen-year period. This particular one will be hard 
to circumvent, not only because it is the outcome of 
a referendum, but also because Ireland has already 
had to carry out a second referendum immediately 
after its negative vote on the Treaty of Nice. Unlike 
the 2001 elections, the latter did not take place in a 
climate of indifference: voter participation was much 
higher than in previous turnouts. The proportion of the 
electorate casting a negative vote was higher (28%) 
than during the 2001 vote. Even if we could discern 
the reasons for the “No” by reading tea leaves—an 
arduous task, inasmuch as such reasons inevitably 
vary in this type of consultation—it would be difficult to 
induce citizens to express an opinion on a treaty which 
would merely be subjected to cosmetic changes. 
So far, the official response to the crisis triggered 
by the Irish vote has been to say that the ratification 
process was to go on, in order to make it clear to the 
Irish that they are isolated. This puts both the Czech 
Republic  and Sweden, who still have not ratified,  in a 
delicate situation, since both countries are due to hold 
the Presidency of the EU in 2009, and may want to ap-
pear as faithful members of the club, so as to maximise 
their influence therein. Assuming this works, the Irish 
would be confronted with a clear choice: either accept 
the Lisbon Treaty in exchange of formal declarations 
confirming it does not threaten their neutrality or their 
ability to ban abortion, or gracefully pull out of the EU in 
order not to prevent the other member countries from 
implementing the changes they willy-nilly approved. 
This scenario, which still appears realistic at the time 
of writing, represents a way around the difficulty rather 
than a solution proper. The current deadlock should 
encourage European leaders to face reality. Insisting 
on a unanimous agreement to bring about changes 
to the treaties is tantamount to rewarding those who 
refuse to accept change for any reason whatsoever. 
You cannot at the same time argue that it is essential 
to maintain an unanimity requirement and be offend-
ed that a few thousand inhabitants of a small country 
may succeed in frustrating the will of the majority. And 
to consult the people until they give the answer the 
elites want hear is but a pale caricature of democracy.
The real challenge is not to find some clever de-
vice to exert pressure on the Irish, but rather to accept 
what has now become obvious: the unanimity required 
to amend the treaties makes reform near impossible. 
Negotiations on the changes to be made in order to 
enable the Union to digest the Eastern enlargement 
started in the run-up to the Amsterdam Treaty, back 
in 1996. More than a decade later, the fate of the re-
form package remains highly uncertain. There would 
be much to be said both on the substance and on the 
process. But one thing is clear: the long shadow of 
unanimity has been the source of endless problems, 
from the bitter bickering of the Nice European Council 
to the façade deliberations of the European Conven-
tion on institutional matters. The messy situation cre-
ated by successive referenda is a mere confirmation. 
What could make sense in a community of six mem-
bers has become a major stumbling block in a Union 
of 27 and more. But in all likelihood, it will take some 
time before national governments come to accept it.
Renaud Dehousse is Jean Monnet Professor of 
European Integration at Sciences Po, Paris
“Menu” Europe:  Re-inventing the EU after 
the Irish No
Vivien A. Schmidt
the eu can’t go on like this.  Whether the Lisbon Treaty 
ultimately succeeds or fails, the Irish referendum will 
have taught us one thing: unanimity and uniformity 
are things of the past. The EU is now too diverse to 
expect all member-states of the EU to ratify any giv-
en treaty or to participate in all areas of EU activity. 
The Problem:  Competing Visions of Europe
Member-states have competing visions of the EU, 
and are increasingly divided over what they would be 
willing to sign up to.  Is the EU to be mainly an ever-
enlarging, borderless free market and security zone 
run by intergovernmental decision-making—as the 
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British, the Scandinavians, and many of the Central 
and Eastern European countries would have it?  Is it 
instead to be more of a values-based community with 
ever-deepening politics and economics and identifi-
able borders stopping before Turkey, Georgia and the 
Ukraine—as Germany, France, Austria, and many oth-
er Continental European countries would like?  Should 
it rather be a borderless rights-based union open to 
all democratizing countries on its borders and increas-
ingly democratic in its decision-making—as the Com-
mission, human rights groups, and philosophers like 
Habermas hope?  And can it also be a global stra-
tegic actor promoting democracy, free markets, com-
munity values, and human rights around the world 
through its “normative” power, whatever its borders—
as EU and national leaders have been proposing? 
The EU branding process was right to replace 
“ever closer union” with “unity in diversity.”  But that 
unity is itself again in question.  The Irish No, by 
stopping the institutional compromise of the Reform 
Treaty, risks reopening the debate about what the EU 
should be at a time when what the EU needs is to 
open the debate about what the EU should do.   Poli-
cies, not institutions, must be the focus of the day if 
the EU is to move forward.  But whatever happens 
with regard to the Lisbon Treaty, it will not solve 
the underlying problem. This is:  How to accommo-
date member-states’ differing visions of the EU? 
The	Solution:		Give	Up	Unanimity	and	Uniformity
There is one way:  give up unanimity and uniformi-
ty.  This is easier to do than one might think, since the 
EU has already breached the principle of unanimity in 
the wide range of areas covered by qualified majority 
voting.  And it has already given up on uniformity in 
areas other than the Single Market.  Thus, the UK and 
Denmark have opt-outs from the Maastricht Treaty. 
Schengen includes non-members like Iceland, Nor-
way, and shortly even Switzerland while members like 
UK and Ireland remain out, as do Bulgaria and Roma-
nia temporarily.   Denmark is not a member of the Eu-
ropean Security and Defense Policy.  The Eurozone 
encompasses 15 of the EU 27.  Freedom of movement 
of workers excludes Romania and Bulgaria for six 
more years.  The Lisbon Treaty would exempt Britain 
and Poland from the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
The member-states themselves also acknowl-
edged the impossibility of a unanimously agreed, 
uniform future by introducing the principles of deep-
er cooperation among select groups of member-
states in successive treaties since the Amsterdam 
Treaty.   The Lisbon Treaty makes these workable 
for two or more countries with “permanent struc-
tured cooperation” for defense and security policy 
and “enhanced cooperation” for any nine or more. 
The push toward uniformity through unanimity 
was absolutely necessary in the early years of the EU 
to create a common set of policies in a free market, 
a sense of community with common standards and 
shared values, respect for human rights, and a global 
actor.   But the unanimity rule, begun by a union of six 
nation-states, now stops the treaty process dead in 
its tracks while the uniformity ideal, the product of a 
Commission dreaming of a federal state, chokes off 
differentiated integration.  Neither is necessary today. 
Rather, we would do better to have opt-outs in place 
of vetoes as the modus operandi for EU “treaties” (to 
stretch the concept) and to see differentiated integra-
tion as a virtue rather than a vice.  If the EU were to 
officially recognize differentiated integration for its 
member-states, and to abandon the unanimity rule, 
it could solve a number of its institutional problems. 
Without the unanimity rule, member-states could 
agree through qualified majority voting on the big 
policy issues to pursue, with the occasional negoti-
ated opt-outs for those members with legitimate res-
ervations about participation in a given area.  Exit 
through opt-out would help avoid the dead-ends on 
policies to which only one or two member-states ob-
ject and/or their dilution in the search for compro-
mise.  In areas where such qualified majority vot-
ing does not work but enhanced cooperation might, 
member-states could pursue deeper integration. 
Moreover, for prospective members in the EU’s pe-
riphery, membership need no longer be a question of 
“in” or “out” but rather of “in which areas” or “out of which 
areas.”   Accession would therefore become a gradual 
process for bordering countries, policy area by policy 
area, once certain initial conditions were met related 
to democratic practices, respect for human rights, and 
internal market reforms.  It would help avoid the “big 
bang” of accession (or rejection) after long years of 
hard-bargaining, provide on-going socialization into the 
EU’s consensual policymaking, ensure implementation 
of EU rules, and promote continued democratization. 
Some might respond that setting up this kind of 
partial membership would not be very attractive. For 
countries in the EU’s periphery, why try to meet the 
criteria demanding significant democracy and market 
opening when neighborhood policy allows entry into 
the European market with criteria that are more ex-
hortatory than real with regard to democratization? 
Similarly, for countries like Norway, Iceland, or Swit-
zerland which are already part of the European Free 
Trade Association (EFTA) or the European Economic 
Association (EEA), and already participate in the Sin-
gle Market in myriad ways, where is the value-added? 
The value-added is in a further, and necessary, 
privilege of membership: institutional participation. 
EUSA Review    Fall 2008   11 
Institutional voice and vote is necessary not only to 
make certain that the policy decisions are accepted as 
the right ones—because all participants would have a 
place at the table to air their concerns and vote their 
preferences—but also to ensure the “democratic” legiti-
macy of the decision-making process and the continued 
democratizing power of attraction of the EU. How this 
would function institutionally would naturally have to be 
worked out—and the Treaties would have to be amend-
ed to allow this. Doing so would help reduce the existing 
democratic deficit for those European countries which 
have chosen for different reasons not to join the EU. 
Toward a ‘Menu’ Europe?  
Once the principles of unanimity and uniformity 
are abandoned, membership in the EU will no lon-
ger be an all or nothing proposition.  Beyond certain 
basic membership requirements—being a democ-
racy which respects human rights and participates 
in the Single Market—member-states will increas-
ingly come to pick and choose the policy “communi-
ties” of which they wish to be a part.  The result is 
differentiated membership in the EU.   This is not to 
suggest, however, that the EU is now to be Europe 
à la carte, as the free marketeers might wish.  Nor 
is it to encourage the communitarians to retreat to a 
“core Europe,” with one dish for all.  Rather, this is an 
elaborate “menu Europe,” with a shared main dish (the 
Single Market), everyone sitting around the table, and 
only some choosing to sit out one course or another.
Vivien	A.	Schmidt is Jean Monnet Professor of Eu-
ropean Integration at Boston University
A shorter version of this essay was published as a Comment in 
the Financial Times, July 22, 2008; an earlier version was pub-
lished on the website of the online French think-tank Telos (www.
telos-eu.com )July 7, 2008.
The	EU’s	Direct	Democratic	Surplus
Gary Marks
there are two ways to approach the question of de-
mocracy in the European Union. The first is a Pla-
tonic approach, which is to ask how an organization 
such as the European Union should be organized 
in principle. How much democracy would be best 
for a polity of this type? How much majoritarianism 
should there be? How much popular participation? 
This is not the approach I wish to take here. 
I am going to take an Aristotelian approach, which 
is to ask what is the least bad course under the par-
ticular circumstances that confront the polity. One vir-
tue of an Aristotelian approach is that it focuses on 
feasible ways to deal with the facts on the ground.
Let me begin with one fact: the demand—and the 
reality—of mass political participation in shaping EU 
institutions. The populist demand for national referen-
dums on the so-called grand treaties has become the 
most consequential form of popular participation in the 
European Union (Hooghe and Marks 2008). Govern-
ments in one country after another have come to believe 
that they need the formal acquiescence of their publics 
in referendums to go ahead with basic European re-
form. Parliamentary votes are not deemed sufficient. 
Public referenda are required even in countries, 
such as the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, 
where the legislature is formally supreme. Since 
the negotiation of the Maastricht Treaty, 29 refer-
endums on Europe have been held in 20 EU coun-
tries. The only EU countries never to have held a 
referendum on Europe are Belgium, Bulgaria, Cy-
prus, Germany, Greece, Portugal, and Romania. 
Referendums are arguably more influential than 
elections for the European parliament, which have 
only a marginal effect on the makeup of parliamentary 
committees or on the distribution of power in the parlia-
ment more generally. Referendums have blocked the 
entry of Denmark and Sweden into European monetary 
union, forced renegotiation of the Maastricht Treaty and 
the Nice Treaty, derailed the Constitutional Treaty, and 
have blocked the Lisbon Treaty. Several reforms, such 
as the entry of the UK into European monetary union, 
have been taken off the agenda because governments 
fear that they would be defeated in popular referen-
dum. Turkish accession may experience the same fate. 
I am not going to take a position on the virtues 
or vices of these reforms, but I do think there are 
compelling grounds to believe that the referen-
dum process—here I am talking about the particu-
lar form this has taken in Europe—is deeply flawed.
In order to summarize the preferences of millions of 
citizens, a referendum boils down an issue into a single 
question that is amenable to a yes or no answer. This 
reduces preferences to dichotomous choices, and in 
so doing, divorces an issue from its context. Referen-
dums conceives choice—for example, to join the EU, 
or not; to have a Constitutional Treaty, or not—as iso-
lated from other choices that governments must make. 
This places a serious burden on the information that 
citizens have on the particular issue. It is well known 
that most citizens have little information about single is-
sues, and in John Zaller’s terms, when the information 
available to voters is thin, voters rely on their predis-
positions (Zaller 1992). These predispositions may be 
related to diffuse support for the government in power, 
even though the subject of the referendum may have 
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little to do with the reasons for government popularity.
At the same time, my own research and that of 
several others suggests that when citizens are con-
fronted with an isolated choice on Europe they are 
prone to appeals to identity, with the result that po-
litical parties and single issue groups that mobi-
lize identity—and in particular, national identity—
are able to frame European referendum debates.
There is a paradox here. Isolating an issue from the 
context of democratic choice in order to facilitate dem-
ocratic choice has the perverse consequence of intro-
ducing concerns that are unrelated to the issue itself. 
This introduces a second perversity. Referendums 
are designed to settle issues, to provide a definitive re-
sult that draws legitimacy from direct democratic par-
ticipation, but the implication of the argument above 
is that referendum outcomes are open to alterna-
tive interpretation. Was the rejection of the constitu-
tional treaty in France and the Netherlands in 2005 
merely an expression of discontent with sitting gov-
ernments? Did it express a defense of national au-
tonomy or opposition to foreign influence? Was it a 
rejection of neoliberal Europe, or was it an affirmation 
of popular bloodymindedness in the face of political 
elitism? The problem is that each of these interpre-
tations has some plausibility. Because issues cannot 
be parsed into independent bytes, but are connected 
in diverse ways, decisions about those bytes are in-
trinsically ambiguous, with the result that referendums 
rarely, if ever, produce the final word: in practice they 
tend to open up, rather than settle, questions.   
One response to these defects might be to claim that 
even though they do not achieve their purported goals, 
referendums increase the level of political discourse in 
a society; they raise the salience of important issues in 
a way that contributes to the quality of democracy.  
I do not find this argument convincing. Jürg Stein-
er and his co-authors (2004), and Thomas Culpepper 
and his co-authors (2008), have found robust positive 
effects for discourse on the quality of democracy in 
discussion groups and legislatures, but they emphasize 
that this effect cannot be scaled up to large scale set-
tings where individuals are more passive consumers of 
political discourse. Referendums, in particular, appear to 
be poor conduits of democratic discourse precisely be-
cause they parse issues into discrete pieces and frame 
alternatives in adversarial terms. The evidence—this is 
stark in the work of Canadian political scientists who 
have investigated referendums on Quebec—suggests 
that referendums encourage polarization rather than 
compromise, and do little to encourage reasoned debate. 
Referendums negate the art of politics, which is 
precisely not to make either/or decisions, but to ne-
gotiate conflict by crafting compromise and trade-offs 
across policies. Referendums bring out the worst in 
mass publics, and the particular way referendums are 
structured in the European Union combines crude ma-
joritarianism with crude unanimity, for rejection of a 
reform in any one country blocks reform in the whole. 
So what to do? It is fairly clear that the challenge 
confronting European decision makers is not wheth-
er to open the process to mass participation, for this 
has already happened. But participation in mass ref-
erendums does not contribute to the quality of de-
mocracy, substantively or procedurally. Rather than a 
democratic deficit, I detect a democratic surplus: an 
unplanned, incoherent, and inappropriate application 
of direct democracy to European decision making. 
A likely response to this on the part of European 
governments is to reduce the number of referendums by 
cutting off their source, the grand treaties, and instead in-
troduce reforms in smaller packages that may avoid the 
referendum process. This is understandable, but short-
sighted. While some might argue that we should turn back 
the tide of democracy in the European Union, I believe it 
is both more fruitful and more feasible to redirect the de-
mand for democracy to representative institutions. This 
is advocated by Simon Hix in What’s Wrong with the Eu-
ropean Union and How to Fix It (2008) and explored in 
relation to group representation by Philippe Schmitter in 
How to Democratize the EU—And Why Bother? (2000).
As the size of polities has changed from the 
Greeks polis to the imagined communities of the na-
tion-state to the multi-level European polity, so have 
the means to exercise democratic control. As juris-
dictional scale has grown, so thinkers and practitio-
ners have conceptualized new ways to institutionalize 
democracy. Democracy is not a fixed set of institu-
tional attributes, but a set of goals which have been 
adapted in novel ways to novel ways of organizing 
political life—which now include the European Union.
Gary Marks is Burton Craige Professor of Political 
Science at the University of North Carolina in Chapel 
Hill and Chair in Multilevel Governance at the Free 
University Amsterdam
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EUSA	Haas	Fund	Fellowship
The 2007-2009 EUSA Executive Committee is 
pleased to announce the 2009 EUSA Haas Fellow-
ship Competition, an annual summer fellowship for 
graduate student EU-related dissertation research. 
We will offer two unrestricted fellowships of $1,500 
each.
The selection committee consists of:
- Liesbet Hooghe (EUSA chair, University of North 
Carolina at Chapel
Hill and Free University of Amsterdam)
- Bonnie Meguid (University of Rochester)
- Jonas Tallberg (Stockholm University)
Applicants must:
• be pursuing the doctoral degree (PhD) at an ac-
credited institution in any country;
• be writing a dissertation in English;
• have an EU-related, doctoral dissertation topic ap-
proved by the formal advisor; and,
• be able to demonstrate the relevance to EU studies 
of the dissertation topic.
Applicants for this Fellowship should submit:
(1) A two-page (max 1,200 words) précis of the dis-
sertation research
(2) One page describing the summer research and 
outlining how the fellowship may be used
(3) A CV
(4) A letter of support from the dissertation advisor to 
be sent directly to eusa@pitt.edu under the heading 
“2009 Haas Fellowship:letter for [applicant name]”
Please send applications to eusa@pitt.edu, and 
use the heading “2009 Haas Fellowship: [applicant 
name].” 
The firm deadline for applications to be received in 
the EUSA office is January 31, 2009. The success-
ful applicant(s) will be notified by March 1, 2009, and 
will receive the grant as soon as the fellowship award 
letter has been signed and returned to EUSA. The 
fellowship will be paid in one lump sum by check
only and in US dollars only.
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EUSA	Political	Economy	Interest	Section
Essay
The Euro as International Currency: 
An Interim Report
Benjamin J. Cohen
how is the euro doing as an international currency?  A 
decade ago, when Europe’s Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) was first getting under way, the conven-
tional wisdom was clear.  It was only a matter of time 
until the old continent’s new money would catch up 
with or perhaps even surpass the U.S. dollar at the 
peak of the world financial system.  Typical was the 
view of two prominent European economists, Daniel 
Gros and Neils Thygesen, who declared enthusiasti-
cally that “the most visible effect of EMU at the global 
level will be the emergence of a second global curren-
cy” (Gros and Thygesen 1998: 373).  In the oft-quot-
ed words of Jacques Delors, former head of the Eu-
ropean Commission, “le petit euro deviendra grand.”
But there were also dissenters, including my-
self.  In a lecture presented in 2003 at the eighth bi-
ennial conference of EUSA (Cohen 2003), I argued, 
to the contrary, that the conventional wisdom was 
wrong.  Europe’s joint money, I suggested, was fated 
to remain a distant second to the dollar long into the 
foreseeable future.  Only in the immediate neighbor-
hood of the European Union (EU), where trade and 
financial ties are especially close, would the euro en-
joy any special advantages.  Elsewhere, the currency 
would be handicapped by several critical shortcom-
ings, all structural in nature, which would severely limit 
its attractiveness as a rival to America’s greenback.
So five years later, what does experience tell us? 
The time seems ripe for an interim report.  Enough 
years have elapsed for us to now take stock of the 
euro’s accomplishments—or lack thereof.  The verdict 
would appear to be that the dissenters had it right.  Eu-
rope’s money has not managed to mount a serious chal-
lenge to the dollar.  The little euro has not become big.
The vision
The vision of euro enthusiasts was always a bit 
vague.  What does it mean to “catch up with” or “sur-
pass” the dollar?  At issue is the degree or extent of 
use of a money for various international purposes–
what is commonly referred to as currency internation-
alization. Cross-border usage of Europe’s currency 
was expected to grow.  But without further explication, 
the notion of currency internationalization is ambigu-
ous at best.  In practical terms, at least three sepa-
rate dimensions are involved: trajectory, scope, and 
domain.  To assess the euro’s achievements and 
prospects, all three dimensions must be considered.
By trajectory, we mean the path traced by the 
euro as its use increases.  Can the growth of usage 
be expected to continue ever upwards until parity 
with the dollar (or more) is attained, or is some ceil-
ing likely to be hit short of that goal?  By scope we 
mean the range of functional categories of use.  Can 
euro usage be expected to grow for all international 
purposes, or just a select few?  By domain we mean 
the geographic scale of use.  Can euro usage be ex-
pected to expand across most parts of the globe, or 
in just a more limited number of countries or regions?
It is hardly a caricature of euro enthusiasts to 
suggest that in their vision, Europe’s currency was 
expected to do well in all three dimensions.  Cross-
border usage would not bump up against a low 
ceiling and would be extensive in terms of both 
function and geography.  In short, it would in time 
become a truly global currency, fully matching if not 
overtaking the dollar in both scope and domain.
The reality
Reality, however, has turned out to be much more 
mundane.  It is simply not true, as two German bank 
economists inexplicably contend, that “the euro has 
caught up in relation to the dollar in nearly all markets 
or areas” (Walter and Becker 2008: 3).   Performance, 
in fact, has been far less impressive than hoped 
for.  After an initial spurt of enthusiasm, internation-
alization of the euro actually appears to be leveling 
off, even stalling, and so far seems confined largely 
to a limited range of functional categories and geo-
graphic regions.  Europe’s currency has successfully 
established itself as second only to the dollar–but it re-
mains, and is likely to remain, a quite distant second.
For a broad picture of what is really happening, 
there is no more authoritative source than the Re-
view of the International Role of the Euro published 
annually by the European Central Bank (ECB). 
The most recent edition of the review appeared in 
June 2008, covering the period to the end of 2007 
(ECB 2008).  Data are provided on all three dimen-
sions involved.  With respect to all three, the Bank’s 
conclusions are unambiguous—and damning. 
Concerning trajectory, the Bank observes that 
international use of the euro has decelerated notice-
ably and would now appear to be stabilizing.  A fast 
early start was certainly to be expected, once mar-
ket actors were persuaded that the euro was here 
to stay.  From the moment of its birth, Europe’s new 
money clearly enjoyed many of the attributes neces-
sary for competitive success.  These included a large 
economic base in the membership of the euro zone, 
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initially numbering some eleven countries—including 
some of the richest economies in the world—and 
soon to comprise sixteen.  They also included un-
questioned political stability and an enviably low rate 
of inflation, all backed by a joint monetary authority, 
the ECB, that was fully committed to preserving confi-
dence in the currency’s future value.  Moreover, there 
was every reason to believe that sooner or later the 
global position of the dollar would weaken, owing to 
the America’s persistent payments deficits and loom-
ing foreign debt.  Hence it was no surprise that in the 
euro’s early days, use seemed to be expanding expo-
nentially.  “Momentum has led to an increase in the 
international role of the euro,” exclaimed the Bank in 
2002 (ECB 2002: 11).  But subsequently, it is plain, 
that momentum has slowed down considerably.  In its 
latest review, the Bank ruefully concedes that after its 
fast start, the international role of the euro “has been 
broadly stable for around five years” (ECB 2008: 11).
In effect, the euro has done little more than hold 
its own as compared with the past aggregate market 
shares of EMU’s “legacy” currencies.  Given the fact 
that Germany’s old Deutsche mark had already at-
tained a rank in the monetary system second only to 
the greenback, anything less would have been a real 
shock.  But beyond that, a ceiling does indeed appear to 
exist.  Straight-line extrapolation of the euro’s initial ac-
celeration far into the future does not seem warranted.
Scope
Likewise, with respect to scope, it is evident 
that growth of euro usage has been uneven across 
functional categories.  While activity has expanded 
in some areas, in others the dominion of the dollar 
remains as great as ever.  The Bank’s polite way of 
putting this is that use of the euro has been “hetero-
geneous across market segments” (ECB 2008: 7).
Expansion has been especially dramatic in the 
issuance of international debt securities, reflecting 
the growing integration of EMU financial markets. 
Indeed, by mid-decade, the euro had actually sur-
passed the greenback as the world’s most important 
currency of issue, with net new issues in euros ris-
ing faster than for any other currency.  At the end of 
2007, euro issues accounted for roughly one-third of 
the outstanding stock of international bonds and notes 
(defined as issues in a currency other than that of the 
borrower’s home country), up from just 19 percent 
in 1999.  Over the same period, the dollar’s share 
fell from around 50 percent to 43 percent.  There 
has also been some modest increase in the euro’s 
share of trade invoicing and central-bank reserves. 
In other categories, however, little or no change 
has occurred.  In foreign-exchange trading, the dol-
lar continues to dominate as a vehicle currency (the 
intermediary for trades between other less widely 
used monies), appearing on one side or the other 
of close to 90 percent of all transactions.  The eu-
ro’s share, by contrast, has remained essentially flat 
at about 37 percent.  Similarly, in the global bank-
ing market, the euro’s share of international loans 
has barely budged, while its share of international 
deposits is now actually lower than it was in 1999. 
The number of countries that formally align their 
exchange-rate policy with the euro, some forty in 
all, is exactly the same as it was when EMU began.
Domain
The picture is also clear with respect to domain, 
which is sharply bifurcated.  For the most part, interna-
tionalization of the euro has been confined to countries 
with close geographical and/or institutional links to the 
euro zone—what might be considered EMU’s natural 
hinterland.  These countries include the newest mem-
bers of the EU, all destined eventually to join EMU, 
as well other candidate states (e.g., Croatia, Monte-
negro) and non-member neighbors like Norway and 
Switzerland.  They also include most of the nations 
around the Mediterranean littoral as well as a good 
portion of sub-Saharan Africa.  In these countries, 
where trade and financial ties are deep, the euro obvi-
ously enjoys a special advantage.  Elsewhere, in stark 
contrast, scale of use drops off abruptly, and Europe’s 
currency remains very much in the dollar’s shadow.
For example, virtually all of the new securities is-
sues denominated in euros come from neighboring 
countries like Britain, Denmark, and Sweden, while on 
the demand side most new issues go to the nearby 
European region or are taken up by investors within 
EMU itself, making them effectively “domestic.”  Else-
where, the greenback still dominates in the holdings 
of debt instruments as foreign assets.  Likewise, of 
the forty countries that peg to the euro in some fash-
ion,  four are European mini-states (Andorra, Mo-
naco, San Marino, Vatican); eight are EU members 
(Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia), and four are actual or 
potential candidates for EU membership (Bosnia, Cro-
atia, Macedonia, Serbia).  None of these governments 
have much choice in the matter.  Another sixteen in-
clude the fourteen members of the CFA Franc Zone 
in Africa together with two affiliated economies (Cape 
Verde, Comoros), all of which were long pegged to the 
French franc even before the euro was born.  And all 
the rest are either in the European hinterland or have 
well established ties with the EU or EU member coun-
tries.  Concludes the ECB (2008: 42): “Close proximity 
to or institutional links with the euro area or the EU... 
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remain the determining factors for the use of the euro.”
The verdict
In sum, the verdict seems undeniable.  As an 
international currency, the euro’s accomplishments 
are spotty at best.  There is no doubt of the money’s 
dominance in its own neighborhood; nor can one 
deny the considerable success it has attained in 
selected areas of activity such as bond issuance.  
But overall, after a fast start, its trajectory has clearly 
bumped up against a hard ceiling, falling short of 
enthusiasts’ expectations.  After nearly a decade of 
experience, it is evident that Europe’s money has 
been unable to come even close to catching up with 
the dollar.  My guess is that if we take stock again in 
another five or ten years, the outcome will look very 
much the same.
Benjamin J. Cohen is Louis G. Lancaster Professor 
of International Political Economy at the University of 
California, Santa Barbara
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Book Reviews
Peter Brennan. Behind Closed Doors. The EU 
Negotiations that shaped Modern Ireland. Dublin: 
Blackhall Publishing, 2008.
over the past few years, many books and articles dedi-
cated to the “Irish miracle” have been written and dis-
cussed both in academia and in European newspapers. 
Ireland has often been considered a “success story” for 
Europe (the “Celtic tiger”) because it underwent such 
remarkable economic development in the 1990s whilst 
many other European economies were in trouble. 
Moreover, much of this success has been attributed to 
the European Union, in particular to its cohesion policy 
and to Irish administrative capacity to implement this 
policy. Peter Brennan’s book is also devoted to the un-
derstanding of the Irish miracle, but adopts a different 
and more original perspective since it looks at policy 
formulation, i.e. the negotiations that representatives 
of Ireland have carried out with EU officials in order to 
obtain as much as possible from EU cohesion policy. 
Adopting a participatory observation methodology, 
the author guides us through a number of key negotia-
tions that have occurred in cohesion policy over the 
past twenty years, from the Delors package I (1987) 
to the most recent cohesion policy regulation (2006). 
In the various chapters of the book, very detailed ac-
counts of Ireland’s capacity to influence decisions ad-
opted by EU institutions are provided, showing clearly 
the concertative mechanisms (within Ireland’s key in-
stitutions) of cohesion policy preference formation and 
the government’s strategic negotiations at the EU level. 
This is a very useful book for several reasons. 
First, it provides an in-depth story of how national in-
terests can be formed and shared not only by the key 
bargaining actors (the Prime Minister–Taoiseach–, 
the Finance Minister and the Permanent Representa-
tives in Brussels) but also by the national Parliament 
(Oireachtas). Furthermore, it shows how active the 
government has been in promoting its national inter-
est also beyond the “traditional” EU targets. A very 
good example of such a capacity is provided by the 
Agenda 2000 negotiations: “The Taoiseach engaged 
in an intensive round of bilateral meetings with his Eu-
ropean counterparts and the Commission […meeting 
with…] the Heads of State and Government” of nu-
merous European States, ensuring “that Ireland’s ap-
proach was well understood by its partners and the 
European Commission” (p. 337). Second, since the 
book covers twenty years of intense diplomatic activ-
ity, we can learn how a small State (Ireland) has been 
able to develop and nourish a durable alliance with the 
European Commission on cohesion policy by gaining 
support from both EU civil servants (not only ones of 
Irish nationality) and EU Commissioners (again, not 
only Irish ones). In other words, Ireland has been par-
ticularly adroit in “dressing up” its own socioeconomic 
interests in “European clothes.” In the words of the au-
thor, the Irish negotiations show “how sheer determina-
tion and perseverance delivers results at EU level” (p. 
133). Third, the account provided by Brennan unveils 
the “Irish miracle” from a new perspective: Ireland was 
not (only) a “tiger” because it was capable of spend-
ing EU funds effectively, but also (and primarily) be-
cause it managed to obtain such funds for a fairly long 
period of time due to successful negotiating. In other 
words, policy negotiation and policy implementation 
are two sides of the same “Irish success story” coin. 
One fundamental question remains unanswered, 
although the author is clearly not to be blamed. The 
book was published before the Irish referendum on the 
new EU Lisbon Treaty (12 June 2008). Having finished 
the book, the reader is left wondering how was a ‘No’ to 
Europe possible? The (cynical) answer is that now Ire-
land does not need Europe anymore. Is this the case? 
Probably. But I am sure the author of Behind Closed 
Doors would have a well informed and well thought 
answer which could be the subject for a fascinating 
new book whose title could be: “Don’t open the door!” 
Paolo R. Graziano, Bocconi University, Milan 
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Sven Biscop and Johan Lembke (eds.). EU Enlarge-
ment	&	the	Transatlantic	Alliance.	A	Security	Rela-
tionship	in	Flux. Boulder:CO: Lynne Rienner, 2008. 
since 9/11 and the Iraq war, publishing on transat-
lantic security relationships has become a kind of 
industry. The parallel and sometimes competitive en-
largements of the European Union and NATO have 
been scrutinized by numerous pieces of research or 
expertise.  But the consequences of EU enlargement 
on transatlantic security relationships have never 
been studied systematically. The support of future EU 
member states for US policy and the so-called “Old 
vs New Europe” crisis it provoked revealed the po-
tential magnitude of the 2004 enlargement’s impact 
on EU international policy in general, and its alli-
ance with the USA in particular. The volume edited 
by Sven Biscop and Johan Lembke fills this gap. 
It raises two main questions that each contributor 
seeks to answer: what is the interplay between EU 
enlargement and fluctuating transatlantic security re-
lations? Will the accession of new EU members rein-
force this partnership or increase the EU’s assertive-
ness as a foreign policy actor? Many chapters are 
written by policy-oriented experts. For this reason, a 
theoretical dimension is almost absent from the book. 
For instance, Nick Witney, first chief executive of the 
European Defence Agency, tackles transatlantic bur-
den-sharing, but the content of the chapter is more 
an exposé of the policy of the EDA than a discus-
sion of the fundamental issue of sharing “burdens.” 
The book therefore lacks a chapter analysing this in 
terms of budgets, military capabilities and the impact 
of 10 new EU members concerning the future of the 
gap between Europe and the United States. Instead, 
the editors’ introductory chapters simply describe a 
changing transatlantic security relationship that has 
never been so much “in flux” since the end of the Cold 
war because, they claim, of the emergence of the 
EU’s European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).
The book’s first part focuses on general issues: 
complementary versus competition between NATO 
and ESDP concerning crisis management, with Sven 
Biscop pleading for rebalancing the Alliance with two 
true pillars: the European Defence Agency, and the 
contributions of ESDP to transatlantic homeland se-
curity (Esther Brimmer). The second part of the book 
is more innovative, examining the impact of East-
ward enlargement for the transatlantic alliance in four 
case studies: Poland, Czech Republic, Bulgaria and 
Turkey. Dursun-Özkanca’s contribution speculates 
on the consequence for the transatlantic relations of 
the three main scenarios for Turkish EU accession 
(membership, “strategic partner”, rejection). EU en-
largement and the inclusion of countries previously 
under Soviet and Russian domination led many West 
Europeans to consider that the new member states 
would become a “Trojan Horse” of Americanism and 
thus reinforce the intra-EU divide between “Atlanti-
cists” and “Europeanists.” Kerry Longhurst on Poland 
and Radek Khol on the Czech Republic show that in 
fact new members have balanced their EU and NATO 
profiles and have pursued a pragmatic approach. 
Instead, they emphasize the impact of the 2004 en-
largement on the “easternization” of EU foreign policy 
and that the efforts of newcomers have slowly but 
surely begun to transform the EU’s own involvement 
in countries on its eastern frontier. They conclude that 
the real tension within Europe might not come from 
the East Europeans' attitudes toward transatlanticism 
but rather from their dramatically different experi-
ences with Moscow and vital national interests in the 
democratisation of the EU's neighbourhood. Indeed, 
2008’s conflict between Georgia and Russia dramati-
cally reminds Europeans that the United States and 
the European Union face new risks and challenges on 
Europe’s periphery. The new flank of the Euro-Atlantic 
community from the Balkans to the Southern Cauca-
sus confronts the EU with chronic “frozen” conflicts 
and a more powerful, nationalist Russia challeng-
ing the western ambitions to enlarge NATO and the 
EU within its immediate neighbourhood. Indeed, the 
book’s third part is devoted to “the European neigh-
bourhood” in a Transatlantic context. Jan Hallenberg 
analyses the new strategic triangle composed by the 
United States, Russia and the European Union in 
the “greater transatlantic region” while Hiski Hauk-
kala examines the European Neighbourhood policy 
and its emphasis on soft power in the context of com-
mon American and European interests in the stability 
of South and East EU’s immediate neighbourhood.
The book provides a policy-oriented analysis 
that is very relevant for readers looking for a pan-
orama of Transatlantic security issues. It offers a 
comprehensive overview of the relationship be-
tween the enlargement of the EU and the chang-
ing transatlantic security relationship in view of 
eastward enlargements of the European Union.
Bastien Irondelle, CERI-Sciences Po Paris
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Didier Georgakakis and Marine de Lassalle, ed. La 
“nouvelle gouvernance européenne”. Genès-
es et usages politiques d’un livre blanc. Stras-
bourg: Presse Universitaire de Strasbourg, 2007
this ambitious book on the genesis and evolution of the 
concept of European governance gathers together a 
significant number of essays offering a composite and 
innovative perspective on the topic. After a detailed in-
troduction by Georgakakis on the ambiguities embed-
ded in the notion of governance itself and on their prac-
tical consequences in the context of the 2001 White 
Book’s preparation, the remainder of the book is orga-
nized around two sections. The first focuses on the ori-
gins and more specifically on the process that led to the 
adoption of the White Book, while section two analy-
ses the multiple usages that the Commission’s text has 
been subjected to during its elaboration and afterwards. 
With some exceptions (e.g., François Foret’s es-
say on the White Book’s discourse), most contributions 
adopt an actor-centered perspective or focus on the 
scope conditions that have affected the drafting and 
adoption of the White Book. This approach, theoreti-
cally rooted in a constructivist sociology framework, is 
undoubtedly a welcome attempt to provide a novel and 
stimulating reading of the conceptualization and opera-
tionalization of the notion of European governance. As 
a result, the book is appealing to a very broad audience 
thanks to the research questions it raises and-more 
generally-for its ability to pinpoint the contradictions 
embedded in the evolution of the European project. 
Due to space constraints it is impossible here to 
comment on each contribution, but the following de-
serve specific mention for their valuable input to the 
current debate and for the originality of the topic se-
lected. In particular, Ioana Popa provides a compre-
hensive account of the current asymmetries in what 
she terms the “scientific space” of the European Stud-
ies discipline, by testing some of the underlying and 
often implicit assumptions (p.117-118) on the interna-
tionalization of research in this field of inquiry. With 
the help of a set of indicators on academic actors and 
the scientific production on the topic, she concludes 
that the existing scholarly output is strongly imbal-
anced towards contributions originating from the UK 
and the US, followed only distantly by research pro-
duced in EU-centred, German and Dutch structures. 
Among the analyses of the attitudes of several play-
ers (i.e., the European Parliament, interest groups and 
the civil society, and national actors at different levels 
of government) towards the White Book, which is the 
main theme of the second half of the book, the con-
trast between the interpretation and usages of the text 
in different Member States is particularly striking. The 
three essays on German municipalities (Lozac’h), the 
French State (de Lassalle) and the central and regional 
levels of the British government (Sloat), highlight a set 
of different issues that -when read in a comparative per-
spective-not only offer a complete picture of the merits 
and shortcomings of the White Book, but also manage 
to uncover the core tensions and trade-offs that char-
acterize the construction of the European Union itself. 
This is a vast project that perhaps raises more 
questions than it can fully answer in practice. To be 
fair, in several instances this is mostly due to the 
complexity of the object under exam. In this respect, 
the book has the merit of highlighting a very compre-
hensive set of issues. However, the diversity of the 
contributions would have benefitted from a tighter 
structure and possibly from a concluding chapter to 
orient the reader among the considerable amount 
of interesting and stimulating perspectives offered 
by the authors. For example, what are ultimately 
the most pressing theoretical and practical ques-
tions for the future? Where should policy-makers in-
tervene? Where are the gaps in academic research 
that need to be filled to better understand the future 
evolution of the concept of European governance? 
That said, the book covers almost everything de-
serving attention as far as governance in the EU is 
concerned, from the complexities generated by di-
verging national perspectives, to the problems result-
ing from heterogeneous interpretations of the role of 
governance, institutions, and the civil society at large, 
or to issues of problem definition in policy-making, as 
reflected in the potential mismatch between the ques-
tions raised by the Commission during the consultation 
for the White Book and the issues deemed relevant 
by the consulted parties (p. 358). In other words, this 
is an ambitious project which leaves both academ-
ics and policy-makers with a lot of food for thought. 
Lorna	Schrefler, University of Exeter
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2009	EUSA	PRIZES		
EUSA	Prize	for	Best	Conference	Paper		
The EUSA Prize for Best Conference Paper will be awarded in 2009 to an outstanding paper presented at 
the 2007 Biennial Conference in Montreal. All those who presented an original paper at the Conference are 
eligible, excepting persons who are current members of the EUSA Executive Committee and persons who 
have already won the EUSA Best Conference Paper Prize. The prize carries a cash award of $100. To 
submit a paper for consideration, send an electronic version in Microsoft Word to eusa@pitt.edu. Please put 
Best 2007 Conference Paper prize in the subject line. The deadline is January 5, 2009.  
EUSA	Prize	for	Best	Dissertation		
The EUSA Prize for Best Dissertation in EU studies will be awarded in 2009 to a dissertation written in 
English on any aspect of European integration submitted in completion of the Ph.D. at any university 
between September 1, 2006 and August 31, 2008. The student must have defended and deposited the final 
dissertation and graduated (been awarded the PhD degree) during this period as well. Dissertations 
submitted for students who did not receive the PhD degree and graduate during the specified time period 
will be disqualified. Only one dissertation per department at an institution may be nominated for this prize. 
The prize carries a cash award of $250. Department chairs (not the dissertation committee chair) should 
submit an electronic copy in Microsoft Word of the dissertation with a short cover letter (letter of transmittal) 
from the chair to the EUSA Administrative Office at eusa@pitt.edu. Please put 2009 Best Dissertation prize 
in the subject line. Dissertations that are not submitted by the department chair will be disqualified. The 
deadline is January 5, 2009.  
Committee members are: 
Neil Fligstein, Chair   Frederic Merand     Chris Ansell 
University of California, Berkeley  University of Montreal  University of California 
EUSA	Book	Prize		
The 2003-05 Executive Committee of the European Union Studies Association established the EUSA Book 
Prize, to be awarded at each biennial EUSA conference, for a book in English on any aspect of EU studies 
and published in the two years prior to the EUSA Conference. This prize carries a cash award of $US 300 to 
the author(s). For the 2009 EUSA Book Prize, to be awarded in Los Angeles, books published in 2007 and 
2008 will be eligible. Authors or publishers will submit three (hard) copies of the nominated book (with a 
letter of transmittal), one to each member of the EUSA Book Prize committee and a cover letter or email to 
the EUSA main office. (Nominated books may not be submitted by e-mail, as galleys or proofs, or in any 
form other than hard-copy published book.) For the 2009 EUSA Book Prize, to be awarded in Los Angeles, 
books published in 2007 and 2008 are eligible. The deadline for receipt of the books by the committee 
members is January 5, 2009. The names and addresses of the committee members are:  
Gerda Falkner  
Director, Institute for European Integration Research  
Austrian Academy of Sciences  
Strohgasse 45/DG  
1030 Vienna, AUSTRIA  
Ken Kollman      Committee Chair: Amy Verdun   
4248 Institute for Social Research    University of Victoria  
University of Michigan     Department of Political Science   
426 Thompson St.     PO Box 3060 STN CSC  
Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1248, USA    Victoria BC V8W 3R4, CANADA
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Reports from 2008-2009 Haas Fund 
Fellowship Winners
Two Worlds of European Collective Action?:
	Civil	Society	Spillover(s)	in	European	
Climate Change Policy   
virtually all european environmental civil society ac-
tors agree that climate change is their biggest chal-
lenge.  They just disagree about what to do about 
it.  Take two recent examples from my research: 
“We are anxious about overusing protest strat-
egies because we don’t want people to think 
that we are just environmental Nazis who 
like to hang ourselves from things. We want 
to be seen as reasonable and professional 
people who understand what is politically pos-
sible.” (Interview, Greenpeace Europe Unit)
“The EU is just a bunch of old guys shaking 
hands inside glass palaces.  They aren’t going 
to help us...  what we need is to organize pro-
test against climate change, for radical social 
change.” (Interview, Climax Network Europe) 
Two different attitudes and action forms are rep-
resented here.  While some civil society organiza-
tions engage in regularized, professional lobbying 
and consultations with European institutions, oth-
ers organize mass, symbolic, and disruptive pro-
tests across the national boundaries of EU member 
states. Despite the observable variation in action 
forms used by civil society organizations active at 
the European level, the relationship between those 
organizations using conventional and contentious 
means–those who lobby and those who protest–is 
largely unknown.  My ongoing dissertation research 
aims to find out if and how they are connected. 
In order to gain analytical purchase on this com-
plex topic, I am using a mixed method social network 
analysis, combing both interview and survey data to 
map connections between European environmen-
tal civil society organizations.  With support from the 
Haas Fund Fellowship, I have already been able to 
conduct interviews, gather documents, and engage in 
participant observation at meetings of climate change 
activists in Copenhagen and at the European Social 
Forum in Malmö.  I am currently conducting similar 
fieldwork with organizations and activists located in 
Brussels as a Fulbright fellow to the European Union. 
My working hypothesis is that the network of civil 
society organizations operating at the European level 
is segmented into two distinct subgroups of organi-
zational actors, meaning that those organizations us-
ing contentious actions forms are only loosely linked 
to those behaving conventionally.  I find evidence of 
two very different socialization experiences of activ-
ists working at the European level that helps explain 
this network segmentation.  On the one hand, some 
activists have been socialized in the sphere of Brus-
sels, undergoing a kind of European “conversion 
experience,” and shifting their attention from the na-
tional to the European level (Marks and McAdam 
1999; Martin and Ross 1998; Streeck and Schmitter 
1998).  On the other hand, another group of activists 
have been socialized in the global justice movement 
protests cycle of the early 2000s, meeting at trans-
national protest events or at the European Social Fo-
rum, and undergoing a kind of “Europeanization from 
below” (della Porta and Caini 2007).  My preliminary 
findings suggest that these very different patterns of 
prior socialization have a major impact on the choice 
of organizational action forms and on the forma-
tion of European civil society networks.  My ongo-
ing research aims to further explore this hypothesis. 
My ultimate research findings will provide original 
insight into the structure of the European environ-
mental civil society network.  This network structure 
matters because it has important implications for EU 
integration and democracy.  Debate about the demo-
cratic credentials of the EU centers on the question 
of “democratic deficit”: is there too little participation 
in the EU, and if so, does it matter?  But when schol-
ars and policy-makers talk about participation in the 
EU, they usually mean the use of conventional action 
forms by professionalized interest organizations (Bey-
ers 2004; Greenwood 2003; Pedler 2002).  This is for 
good reason: previous work has suggested that there 
hasn’t been much European level protest (Imig and 
Tarrow 2001; Rucht 2001) and that the open structure 
of EU institutions make it unlikely that there ever will 
be (Marks and McAdam 1999).  My study challenges 
this conventional wisdom by pointing to an explosion of 
contentious European level behavior that has emerged 
in the last ten years (Balme and Chabanet 2008). 
Moreover, the  participation of collective actors in 
European politics is commonly considered one of the 
motors of integration. As Haas remarked in The Uniting 
of Europe, “perhaps the chief finding is that group pres-
sure will spillover into the federal sphere and thereby 
add to the integrative pressure” (Haas 1958: xiii).  But 
participation can be a double-edged sword for democ-
racies. On the one hand, an integrated network of civil 
society organizations attempting to influence EU pol-
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icy through a variety of means in an “insider-outsider 
coalition” may increase the perceived importance and 
legitimacy of these institutions.  On the other hand, the 
existence of an isolated, contentious group of protes-
tors who participate only indirectly in EU politics may 
do just the opposite. If contentious participation outside 
of institutional channels reveals the lack of confidence 
citizens have in the institutions of the European Union, 
this could undermine these institutions’ perceived le-
gitimacy, effective functioning, and ability to implement 
policy, thereby altering the character and pace of the 
integration process. Thus through empirical network 
analysis, my research sheds light on the complex and 
sometimes contradictory relationship between the spill-
over of group pressure to the European level and the 
prospects for European integration and democracy.
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Report	on	EUSA	Haas	Fund	
Fellowship Research
i am currently living abroad in Estonia where I have 
been conducting field work in each of the Baltic States 
and writing up my dissertation project. My dissertation 
project, “The Language of Belonging: The Russian 
Minorities in the Baltic States” concerns the effect of 
the EU and Russia on integration policies in the Bal-
tic States in the post-accession period. The project 
is under the supervision of my dissertation chair Dr. 
James Goldgeier at the George Washington University.
Over the course of the past year I have further 
developed my research methodology which is based 
on a Q method technique and interviews with integra-
tion elites in each country. My field instrument, which 
consists of 56 statements drawn from both the Rus-
sian and titular language media in each state, has 
been front translated and back translated into all 
three Baltic languages and into Russian. From Feb-
ruary-June 2008 I completed my Estonian fieldwork, 
which consisted of interviews with 29 policy elites. I 
also completed my field work in Latvia in May 2008, 
which consisted of interviews with 33 policy elites, 
and my field work in Lithuania in September 2008, 
which consisted of interviews with 28 policy elites. 
Financial support from the EUSA Haas Fund fellow-
ship was crucial for helping me to cover the costs of 
front-translation, back-translation and proofreading of 
my Q method instrument in four languages (Estonian, 
Latvian, Lithuanian, and Russian) and for supporting 
living and research costs in each of these countries.
I was able to spend this past summer writing up 
the comparative research results of my Estonian and 
Latvian case studies. I presented the findings for the 
Estonian case at the co-sponsored ASN conference 
in Paris July 2-5 2008, and the comparative results of 
the Estonian and Latvian cases at the ISA-NE confer-
ence held in Baltimore October 3-4, 2008. Despite the 
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shared history of Soviet occupation and pressure from 
international actors to integrate their Russian minori-
ties, the Q analysis reveals important differences with 
respect to how elites in Estonia and Latvia view the 
integration of the Russian minority in their respective 
states as well as the influence from international actors 
both prior to and after EU accession. Results of the re-
search show that European norms and recommenda-
tions from European institutions are not very influential 
in the post-accession period. Given that the changes to 
minority policies in the late 1990s have not translated 
into significantly higher levels of structural integration, 
the impact of EU conditionality in the area of minority 
rights is rather limited in these cases. In addition, both 
the Q study, as well as interviews with integration elites, 
shows that Russia’s activism does impact attitudes to-
ward integration and language use in these societies 
in ways that work against integration and mutual ac-
commodation between majority and minority groups. 
The study reveals three discourses, or viewpoints, 
among Estonian elites and three discourses among Lat-
vian elites.  Among Estonian elites, the Russian minor-
ity in Estonia is no longer seen as threatening to Esto-
nian culture and identity which is evident of a change in 
rhetoric since the early 1990s and provides hope for the 
Estonian integration program. However, while Europe 
remains a “positive” other for Estonian national identity, 
Russia still remains the dominant “negative” other and 
therefore has the potential to produce reactionary poli-
cy decisions on the part of Estonian elite that may hurt 
future prospects for integration in Estonian society. This 
is true especially in relation to views of history and lan-
guage which remain divisive policy issues for Estonian 
elites. Estonia is at a critical point in its nation-building 
project in which a genuine desire for the cultivation of 
an inclusive national identity is tempered by confu-
sion over what this new identity should look like and 
disagreements over the role that language and under-
standings of history should play in this new conception. 
The results of the Q study in Latvia reveal a much 
greater polarization among Latvian elites along ethnic 
lines with respect to citizenship and language issues. 
Unlike in the Estonian case, one discourse among Lat-
vian elites views threats to Latvian identity, language 
and culture, from both the Russian state and from the 
prevalent use of Russian in Latvian society. Among 
this group of elites there is also skepticism regarding 
the loyalty of noncitizens to the Latvian state. Russia 
is viewed as having the potential to destabilize Latvi-
an society by perpetuating myths within the Russian 
community and therefore remains a dominant nega-
tive other in national identity construction. Europe is 
viewed as a positive other by Latvian elites however 
European institutions are not likely to be able to influ-
ence minority policies in a more positive direction in the 
post-accession period. Debates over the development 
of a more inclusive national identity were not as preva-
lent among Latvian elites as Estonian elites. In Latvia, 
attitudes toward language use in society are viewed 
as the key problem for bringing the two communities 
closer together as opposed to the problem of language 
learning in the Estonian case. While commonalities 
between elites in Estonia and Latvia are evident with 
respect to conflicts over interpretations of history and 
the focus on language as the key to integration, differ-
ences in threat perception in relation to the Russian 
minority and the degree of polarization among elites 
remain important differences between the two cases. 
Previous studies that have focused on the impact 
of international actors on the development of minor-
ity policies and democratization in these cases cannot 
adequately explain the different attitudes of integration 
elites in these societies, or the different language and 
citizenship policies that were adopted in each of these 
cases. This research shows that elites act as filters 
between international pressure to change policies and 
the form that those policies and conceptions of integra-
tion take in these societies. Europe and Russia have 
been important external others in the construction of 
national identity in Estonia and Latvia and history has 
shaped perceptions of these actors among elites in 
ways that matter for understanding the effects of exter-
nal pressure on policy change in these societies. Differ-
ences in elite attitudes and the degree of polarization 
between elite discourses in Estonia and Latvia cannot 
be explained by international pressure alone but must 
be understood in relation to domestic factors. The dif-
ferences between the two cases can most likely be ex-
plained by three primary factors: the politicization of mi-
nority issues, the different starting points of legislation, 
and the ethnic and linguistic demography in each state. 
I hope to travel to Strasbourg in January 2009 in 
order to interview Council of Europe elites who have 
been involved in monitoring the Framework Conven-
tion for the Protection of National Minorities in the 
Baltic States, and in advising these states on minority 
policies. These interviews will contribute to a greater 
understanding of how differences in understanding of 
international norms between norm-setters and norm-
followers can influence the impact and implementation 
of minority rights norms in the Baltic States. Money from 
the EUSA Haas Fund Fellowship that was not spent on 
translation will be used to help fund this research trip.
I hope to submit a draft of my dissertation proj-
ect to my dissertation committee in early Spring 2009 
and, depending on necessary revisions, to defend 
my dissertation project sometime in late Spring 2009.
Jennie	Schulze, George Washington University
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